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PROPPING UP THE ILLUSION OF COMPUTER PRIVACY IN
UNITED STATES V. BURGESS
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that, like many Americans, you bring your laptop to and
from the office every day. On it you have sensitive work information,
perhaps personal photos and correspondences, and your browsing his-
tory. Imagine also that on your drive to work you get pulled over and the
police have probable cause to search your vehicle. Can they flip open
your laptop and begin browsing your work files? Your personal files?
Your browsing history? Can they restore your deleted files and search
those?
Now imagine they are looking for evidence of drug trafficking. Is
there a limit to the types of files they may open? Can they open only
spreadsheets or files with suspicious names, such as "heroinpro-
ceeds.xls?" Can they look at your personal photos, or your browsing
history? And, if they find evidence of a different crime, can they use it
against you?
Those are some of the questions faced by David Burgess and the au-
thorities that searched two hard drives found in his motor home during a
traffic stop. When the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Bur-
gess's case, it attempted to answer two specific questions: First, do com-
puters qualify as containers, along with all the implications to a search
that conclusion brings; second, if computers are containers, do any dis-
cernible concepts limit law enforcement access to personal computer
files?
Part I of this Comment summarizes the Tenth Circuit's analysis of
these issues in United States v. Burgess,' the court's most recent foray
into the world of computer privacy. Part II examines the implications of
treating a computer like a container, concluding that in several instances
such a treatment will result in a greater number of searches of computers.
Part III considers whether other Fourth Amendment doctrines will in-
crease or decrease the privacy right associated with a computer and its
contents. In Part IV, this Comment examines the difficulties involved in
limiting the scope of computer searches. Finally, Part V concludes that
the privacy protections applied in Burgess were wholly illusory, and ar-
gues that the court should have either rejected additional safeguards for
computer privacy, or applied real-not illusory--computer privacy pro-
I. 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009).
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tections by following the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.
2
I. UNITED STATES V. BURGESS
A. Facts
At a restaurant parking lot in Evanston, Wyoming, State Trooper
Matt Arnell spotted a motor home known to be associated with the Hell's
Angels motorcycle club bearing Nevada license plates and towing a trai-
ler with expired Wyoming license plates. 3 Arnell followed the vehicle
onto Interstate 80; after calling the dispatcher to request the assistance of
a canine drug unit, he pulled over the motor home in order to cite the
owner for the expired plates.4 As the driver, Shayne Waldron, exited the
motor home, Arnell smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from
the vehicle.5 While Arnell spoke with Waldron, David Burgess-the
owner of the motor home-joined the conversation. 6 Before Arnell fin-
ished writing the citation, Deputy David Homar arrived with his police
dog, Blitz, who alerted to the motor home's doors.7
Arnell informed Burgess of his intent to search the motor home.
8
Burgess requested that Arnell obtain a warrant.9 Based on the marijuana
odor and Blitz's alert, however, Arnell proceeded to search the motor
home without a warrant.'0 Arnell found marijuana, a pipe, and fourteen
grams of cocaine in the motor home." Burgess admitted that the mai-
juana belonged to him.' 2 Arnell continued the search, locating a laptop
computer and a Seagate hard drive. 13 Arnell seized the vehicle, which
was towed to a Wyoming Department of Transportation facility for addi-
tional inspection.'
4
Arnell and Agent Russell Schmidt of the Green River police de-
partment offered a sworn affidavit and requested a warrant to search the
hard drives.' 5 Agent Schmidt stated in the affidavit that drug traffickers
often keep photos of drugs and their co-conspirators in their vehicles.'
6
The county judge approved the warrant, authorizing a search of the hard
2. 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).









12. Id. at 1083.
13. Id. The first search took less than thirty minutes. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Agent Hughes described these as "trophy photos." Id. at 1084 (defining "trophy pho-
tos" as "pictures of 'a person holding the controlled substance in front of a stack of money').
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drives for records, "pay-owe sheets," and "items of personal property
which would tend to show conspiracy to sell drugs."'
' 7
Agent Scott Hughes of the Internet Crimes Against Children Divi-
sion was assigned to search the seized hard drives.' 8 Following protocol,
Hughes used the "EnCase" computer program to duplicate the contents
of the hard drives seized from Burgess's motor home.' 9 The EnCase pro-
gram allows an investigator to preview files as they are being copied.2°
The previewed files are displayed in a "gallery view" at a reduced size,
many to a page.2' Hughes used this feature to look for photos of con-
trolled substances while the drive was being copied.22 Hughes had
viewed 200 to 300 digital images while the files were transferring when
he discovered an image depicting child sexual exploitation.23 Pursuant to
a DCI staff attorney's instructions, Hughes then stopped his search and
requested a new warrant authorizing a search for evidence of child sexual
exploitation. 24 Searching under the auspices of the new warrant, Hughes
found numerous images of child pornography on both the hard drives
seized from Burgess's motor home.
A grand jury indicted Burgess under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1),
which prohibits the knowing transportation of child pornography across
state lines, and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), which prohibits
the knowing possession of child pornography transported in interstate
commerce. 26 Prior to trial, Burgess moved to suppress the evidence
found on the hard drive that was the basis for his indictment on both
counts.27 Burgess claimed the initial search of the hard drive, which
sought to uncover evidence of drug trafficking, violated the Fourth
17. Id. at 1083. The warrant described:
"The property and premises of a white, 1999, Freightliner Motorhome . . .[for] certain
property and evidence to show the transportation and delivery of controlled substances,
which may include but not limit[ed] to, cash, or proceeds from the sale of controlled sub-
stances, Marijuana, Cocaine, Methamphetamine, or other illegal controlled substances,
along with associated paraphernalia to include but not limited to pipes, bongs, syringes,
packaging material, computer records, scales, laboratory dishes, flasks, beakers, tubes,
pie tins, electrical timers, containers to be used for storing, manufacturing and selling,
chemicals used in the creation of illegal narcotics as well as their diluting agents, items of
personal property which would tend to show conspiracy to sell drugs, including pay-owe
sheets, address books, rolodexes, pagers, firearms and monies."
Id. (alterations in original).
18. Id. The warrant allowed the agents to search Burgess's laptop, the Seagate external hard
drive, and a second hard drive manufactured by Maxtor. Id. However, the warrant's scope was
limited to searching for evidence related to controlled substances. Id. Agent Hughes was instructed
by a DCI staff attorney to obtain a new warrant should he find evidence of other crimes. Id.
19. Id. at 1083-84.




24. Id. at 1083-84.
25. Id. at 1084. Although he stopped counting at 1,300 images, Hughes estimated the total
number of images of child pornography contained on the two hard drives was over 70,000. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Burgess filed additional motions outside the scope of this Comment. Id.
2010]
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Amendment requirement that search warrants describe items sought by
the government with sufficient particularity.28 The government countered
by asserting that even if the warrant was deficient, the search was still
permissible under the automobile exception. 29 Rather than rely solely on
the automobile exception to uphold the search, the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming found that the warrant contained suf-
ficient particularity with respect to the items to be seized. 30 A jury con-
victed Burgess on both counts, and he appealed the denial of his motion
to suppress.
31
B. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
Examining Burgess's case, the Tenth Circuit considered two meth-
ods of applying Fourth Amendment protections to computers. First, the
court considered whether a computer is a container and therefore subject
to search under the automobile exception.32 Second, the court considered
whether it was possible to fashion a rule that would adequately limit the
scope of computer searches without precluding such searches altogether.
Although the Tenth Circuit expressed concern about the potential abuse
of computer searches, it ultimately failed to devise a rule that would pro-
tect citizens from "file-by-file" rummaging without significantly interfer-
ing with legitimate law enforcement interests.
1. Are computers containers?
Under the automobile exception announced in Carroll v. United
33States, an officer may perform a warrantless search of a vehicle, pro-
vided probable cause exists. 34 In California v. Acevedo, 31 the Supreme
Court held that the automobile exception applies uniformly to the interior
of a vehicle, including any containers that are present.36 Because the
Tenth Circuit had previously analogized a computer to a suitcase,37 it
would be a small step for the court to hold that the automobile exception
allows officers to search a laptop computer without a warrant when the
28. Id.; see also Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief at 5, Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (No. 08-
8053), 2009 WL 1258555 ("The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant describe the
things to be seized with sufficient particularity to prevent a general exploratory rummaging in a
person's belongings." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Campos, 221
F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000))). See generally United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1362
(10th Cir. 1997) ("A warrant's description of things to be seized is sufficiently particular ifit allows
the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized.").
29. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1084.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1086-87. Burgess' other arguments on appeal are outside the scope of this Com-
ment.
32. Id. at 1087-88.
33. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
34. Id. at 155-56.
35. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
36. See id. at 580.
37. See United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom.
Andrus v. United States, 552 U.S. 1297 (2008).
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computer is found pursuant to a vehicle search supported by probable
cause.38 The Burgess court reinforced this possibility by referencing the
language of Acevedo, which "interpret[ed] Carroll as providing one rule
to govern all automobile searches., 39 This "one rule" language could
foreclose the possibility of treating a computer differently than a con-
tainer, if the Tenth Circuit correctly interpreted Acevedo as compelling
the equal treatment of all objects capable of containing evidence in an
automobile. As the court stated, "Nothing in Acevedo suggests [a com-
puter search]... would be impermissible without a warrant....,,4
The court also discussed an alternative4' to treating a computer as a
container: treating it as a "virtual home. 42 Because computers are capa-
ble of storing vast amounts of personal information, they may deserve
the enhanced Fourth Amendment protections the Supreme Court has so
far reserved only for homes.4 3 Indeed, the Burgess court cited a Tenth
Circuit precedent cautioning that "the sheer range and volume of per-
sonal information the computer may contain" argues for treating a com-
puter differently than a simple container.4a
The Tenth Circuit found no case law that directly addressed the is-
sue, and ultimately declined to resolve it.45 The court skirted the "one
rule" language presented by Acevedo, stating the truism, "[S]eemingly
well-settled matters are subject to change, ' ,46 and referencing the Su-
preme Court's recent change to Fourth Amendment automobile excep-
tion jurisprudence in Arizona v. Gant.47 The Tenth Circuit explained:
38. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1087-88.
39. Id. at 1089 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579).
40. Id. at 1090.
41. The court also implies a third way of treating a laptop, suggesting that its United States v.
Carey decision created different rules for seizure than for searching a laptop. See id.; United States
v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999). Under Carey, a laptop may be seized and secured
while a warrant is obtained. 172 F.3d at 1275. This begs a comparison with the Supreme Court's
treatment of automobiles. In Chambers v. Maroney, the Court suggested that a vehicle could either
be searched pursuant to the automobile exception, or could be seized and secured until a warrant is
issued. 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970). Yet in that very same case, the Court upheld a warrantless search of
a vehicle in custody. Id. This treatment also raises the question of what level of suspicion should be
required of an officer seizing a digital storage device. With the prevalence of laptops, cell phones,
iPods and Blackberry devices, the likelihood of a person encountering law enforcement having such
a device in their vehicle is high. A low standard for seizure of these devices may incentivize law
enforcement to seize them routinely without individualized suspicion. On the other hand, a high
standard of seizure may not be reconcilable with Acevedo's ruling that no individualized suspicion is
required to search containers within a permissibly searched automobile.
42. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1088.
43. Id. at 1088-89.
44. Id. at 1088 (citing United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009)).
45. Id. ("[Tihe parties have cited no case law which either allows or prohibits computer
equipment searches under the automobile exception and our research has failed to uncover such
authority.").
46. Id. at 1090.
47. Id. (citing Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (2009); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 460 (1981)).
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In spite of clear language in Acevedo, one might speculate whether
the Supreme Court would treat laptop computers, hard drives, flash
drives or even cell phones as it has a briefcase or give those types of
devices preferred status because of their unique ability to hold vast
amounts of diverse personal information.48
Despite its extensive discussion of the manner of application of the
Fourth Amendment to computers found during valid automobile
searches, the Burgess court avoided the issue by simply affirming the
District Court's holding that the warrant issued to search Burgess's mo-
tor home was valid.49
2. Scope of a computer search
Although the Burgess court failed to grant preferential Fourth
Amendment protections to laptop computers in automobiles, it neverthe-
less considered ways to limit the scope of permissive computer
searches.5° Specifically, the court asked whether there was anything
Agent Hughes was compelled to do to protect Burgess's privacy rights
associated with his computers. The court concluded, however, that there
is no good way to limit the scope of a computer search, and that such
searches will always amount to general searches of the computer's con-
tents. "[I]n the end," the court explained, "there may be no practical sub-
stitute for actually looking in many (perhaps all) folders and sometimes
at the documents contained within those folders, and that is true whether
the search is of computer files or physical files.'
At first blush, this holding appears to run contrary to two prior deci-
sions issued by the court. First, in United States v. Carey,52 the court said
in a dictum that computer searches should be limited to the information
specified in the warrant through methods such as "observing files types
53
and titles listed on the directory, doing a key word search for relevant
terms, or reading portions of each file stored in the memory." 54 Second,
in United States v. Walser,55 the Tenth Circuit held that a computer
search must be conducted in a manner that "avoids searching files of
types not identified in the warrant.',
56
48. Id.
49. See id. at 1088, 1091. Because the laptop in an Acevedo search issue was presented by the
Government as an alternative method of finding the search of Burgess's computers valid, the up-
holding of the warrant's validity rendered that issue moot. See id. at 1091-92.
50. Id. at 1092-93.
51. Id. at 1094.
52. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
53. File types are often identified by a string of alpha-numeric characters appended to the file
name known as "file name extensions." See, e.g., Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1093 & n.16.
54. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276.
55. 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001).
56. Id. at 986 (finding that agent used a clear search methodology, only searching records
where evidence might logically be found).
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The court explained its divergence from the Carey dictum by ex-
plaining that because the scope of a computer search can never be less
than the subject matter described in the warrant and affidavit, the limita-
tions suggested in Carey cannot effectively restrict a computer search.5 7
The objects of the government search can be hidden using misleading
directory or file names 58 or disguised by false file extensions. 59 Keyword
searches cannot confine a computer search because keyword searches are
based on file names, which may be unreliable or inaccurate. 60 Even the
file directory structure can be manipulated so as to obfuscate investiga-
tors, and the directory itself may simply be too confusing to provide a
means of restricting the scope of a search.6'
The court explained how its decision in Burgess was not inconsis-
tent with Walser by explaining that even the most well-intentioned
search protocol may eventually degenerate into general file-by-file rum-
maging. 62 The court stated, "[1]t is folly for a search warrant to attempt to
structure the mechanics of the search, 63 but asserted that this will not
always be the case, admonishing that privacy rights require "an officer
executing a search warrant to first look in the most obvious places and as
it becomes necessary to progressively move from the obvious to the ob-
scure." 64 The flaw in this statement became immediately apparent to the
court: if an officer is to conduct a thorough search, and all of the limits
identified in Carey may conceal legitimate search objects, then no search
will be thorough unless it degenerates into a file-by-file general rummag-
ing.65 Thus, the court concluded, "in general a structured approach may
provide only the illusion of protecting privacy interests."
66
Despite concluding that "[t]he preview technique may be problem-
atic in other contexts," the Tenth Circuit upheld the search.67 First, the
court praised Agent Hughes's decision to terminate his search as soon as
he found evidence of criminal wrongdoing not specified by the warrant,
and to secure a warrant with greater scope.68 Part of Carey's holding
57. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1092-93.
58. Id. at 1093-94 & n.18 ("While file or directory names may sometimes alert one to the
contents (e.g., 'Russian Lolitas,' 'meth stuff,' or 'reagents'), illegal activity may not be advertised
even in the privacy of one's personal computer-it could well be coded or otherwise disguised.").
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1093.
61. Id. ("The directory structure might give hints as to an effective search strategy, but could
just as well be misleading and most often could not effectively, or even reasonably, be described or
limited in a warrant.").
62. See id. at 1094.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. (explaining that investigators may be required to search all computer folders and
even preview files to ensure complete searches).
66. Id. at 1095.
67. Id. at 1094.
68. Id. at 1094-95.
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mandated this restriction on computer searches.69 However, the court
recognized that the only distinction between Carey's requirement (to
await a new warrant upon finding evidence outside the scope of the exist-
ing warrant) and no requirement at all, is that the files "would be discov-
ered later, rather than earlier., 70 Second, the court reasoned that Agent
Schmidt's affidavit included images of drugs as part of the search pa-
rameters, allowing Agent Hughes to look at image files.71 Because
Hughes began the search by looking at digital image files, the search
conformed to the court's requirement that agents "first look in the most
obvious places. 72 Third, because Hughes was allowed to search for pho-
tographs, he would inevitably have found the child pornography.73 Fi-
nally, and tellingly, the court pointed out that Burgess 74 was unable to
proffer a suitable alternative rule.
75
II. THE COMPUTER-CONTAINER ANALOGY EXPANDS COMPUTER
SEARCHES
The Burgess court discussed, in part, whether a computer may be
directly analogized to a container.7 6 Part H of this Comment examines
the implications of a strict computer-container analogy, and argues that
such treatment would significantly expand the ability of law enforcement
to search a computer.77
A. The Automobile Exception
The Tenth Circuit discussed the automobile exception at consider-
able length in Burgess. Generally, people enjoy less privacy expectations
in their cars than they do in their homes.78 As the Supreme Court stated,
"The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist's car as his castle."
79
69. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999).
70. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1095. Essentially, Hughes could have kept searching for photos of
drugs and inadvertently discovered each and every instance of child pornography. Id.
71. Id. at 1083-84, 1095.
72. Id. at 1094. Although the court does not address it, some concern may be warranted over
an agent trained in ferreting out child pornography immediately searching for evidence of drug
distribution by looking at digital image files.
73. Id. at 1095.
74. This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit could not come up with any good alternative
either. See infra Part IV.
75. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1095.
76. Id. at 1087-90.
77. If the implications of a strict analogy of computers and containers are disturbing, the
treatment of computer as a "virtual home" is untenable. In California v. Carney, the Supreme Court
upheld a search of a vehicle under the automobile exception that served as the defendant's actual
home. 471 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1985). Clearly in Carney, the amount of personal information stored
within the defendant's motor home equated with that of an actual home. However, the Court applied
not the enhanced protections associated with a home, but reduced protections associated with an
automobile. If Carney's motor home did not deserve the heightened Fourth Amendment protection
that the Court typically extends to homes, the idea that the Tenth Circuit was unwilling to extend
heightened protection to Burgess's laptop computer should be utterly unremarkable.
78. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
79. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004).
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The automobile exception permits an officer to search a vehicle without
a warrant when that officer has probable cause to believe evidence or
contraband may be found in the vehicle. 0
Under United States v. Ross,81 an officer with probable cause to
search a vehicle could only extend the warrantless search to a container
within the vehicle if the officer had probable cause to believe that the
container "may conceal the object of the search. 8 2 The Supreme Court
weakened that requirement in California v. Acevedo, 3 however, by al-
lowing a warrantless search of a vehicle under the automobile exception
to extend to containers within that vehicle regardless of whether probable
cause exists for each individual container. s4 In Wyoming v. Houghton 
the Court clarified that an officer who has probable cause to search a
vehicle may conduct a warrantless search of any container within the
vehicle capable of concealing the sought items.86 This rule extends to all
containers found in a vehicle, regardless of the ownership of the con-
87tainer.
As Burgess contemplates, a strict computer-container analogy
would allow a warrantless search of any computer found in an automo-
bile so long as the police have probable cause to search the vehicle itself.
Under Houghton, the law would not distinguish between a computer
owned by a passenger and one owned by the vehicle's owner. Thus, any
digital storage device-regardless of its ownership--is subject to imme-
diate, warrantless search by an officer who finds the device while execut-
ing a valid vehicle search, provided that the device is capable of conceal-
ing the items sought by the officer.
B. Search Incident to Arrest
In addition to expanding searches pursuant to the automobile excep-
tion, a strict computer-container analogy would likely to increase the
number of computer searches incident to arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court
explained the search incident to arrest doctrine in Chimel v. California,88
where it established that an officer without a warrant may search the area
within the arrestee's immediate control in order to protect officer safety
and to prevent the destruction of evidence. 89 Under New York v. Belton,90
80. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 388.
81. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
82. See id. at 825.
83. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
84. See id. at 574.
85. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
86. See id. at 307.
87. Id.
88. 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
89. Id. at 763.
90. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
2010]
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a Chimel search extends to an automobile if the arrestee is driving.91
Therefore, under the rule in Chimel-and assuming a strict container-
computer analogy regime-an officer's search of a laptop or digital stor-
age device in the possession of a lawfully arrested person could be un-
dertaken without a warrant.
The Supreme Court established a new rule for searches incident to
arrest in Arizona v. Gant.92 Under the Gant rule, a warrantless search
incident to arrest of an automobile occupant is permissible when either
the search is for evidence of the arresting offense or when the officer
cannot secure the arrestees.93 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
left open the possibility that either search might be justified in contexts
outside of a roadside vehicle stop.94
Because Ross allows an officer to search any container capable of
containing the object of the search provided the container is found during
a valid vehicle search,95 the combination of Ross and Gant broaden the
ability of police to search containers following an arrest. Taken together,
the two cases allow an officer, after a lawful arrest for an evidence-based
crime, to conduct a warrantless search for evidence of that crime
throughout the arrestee's vehicle and in any container in that vehicle, so
long those containers are capable of hiding the sought evidence. If Jus-
tice Steven's suggestion-that Gant may be the rule for any search inci-
dent to arrest-is correct, a container within the control of an arrestee is
automatically subject to warrantless search so long as it could contain
evidence of the arresting offense.
Extending the Gant-Ross rule to the digital evidence context, a
computer must be capable of containing pertinent evidence of the crime
before an officer is allowed to search it without a warrant. However, in
this multimedia age, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a com-
puter is incapable of containing evidence-such as photographs-of a
crime. While it may be far-fetched to assert that a defendant or his pas-
senger had taken digital photographs of a minor infraction such as a traf-
fic violation, certainly such photographs are capable of existing on a
computer.
IH. PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS ON YOUR COMPUTER
While search doctrines that embrace the computer-container anal-
ogy will likely lead to a greater number of computer searches, police
may access personal computer information in some instances without
91. Id. at 460. The occasions which would trigger an automobile's search incident to arrest
and the extent of that search has been limited by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant, but the
principle remains the same. 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
92. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
93. Id. at 1718-19.
94. Id. at 1721.
95. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
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ever implicating the Fourth Amendment. In Katz v. United States,96 Jus-
tice Harlan's concurrence defined a search as a violation of a legitimate
expectation of privacy.97 The question then, is when does a person have a
legitimate expectation of privacy on their computer? Courts have gener-
ally held that a personal computer, in most circumstances, is not accessi-
ble by the public at large, and therefore subject to a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.98 However, in some situations that expectation is strong-er, and in some cases no legitimate expectation exists whatsoever.
A. File Sharing
It is axiomatic that public places are not subject to the same expec-
tations of privacy as private places. 99 When a person uses file sharing
software, they grant public access to the private content on their com-
puter. In essence, a person using a program such as Napster or LimeWire
to share files with the public may also be destroying a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in their computer. That was exactly the situation pre-
sented to the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Stults.'0° In Stults, the
court held that the government's inspection of the defendant's downloads
folder did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because the defendant's
decision to use and install a file sharing program rendered that folder
open to the public. 01 Conceivably, after Stults, a court would uphold a
federal agent's suspicionless and warrantless search of any computer
folder that is accessible by a file sharing program.
B. Deleted Files
The Supreme Court has also held that a warrantless search of items
that a person has abandoned does not implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment. '0 2 In California v. Greenwood, the Court held that a warrantless
police search of sealed, opaque garbage bags left on the street did not rise
to the level of a "search," in the meaning of Katz, because a person aban-
dons any reasonable expectation of privacy by making items or informa-
tion available to the general public.'03 Deleted computer files are not set
out on the curb or otherwise available for public inspection. Nor are de-
leted computer files handed over to a third party for destruction. How-
96. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
97. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J. concurring).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 721 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (M.D. Pa. 2008); United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936
(W.D. Tex. 1998).
99. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988) (holding search of garbage
left on public streets warranted no legitimate expectation of privacy and did not implicate Fourth
Amendment).
100. 575 F.3d 834, 843 (8th Cir. 2009).
101. Id. Interestingly, the defendant claimed he did not know that the program opened his
computer to the public, yet the court still found that the defendant "opened his download folder to
the world." Id.
102. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41-42.
103. Id. at 40-42.
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ever, computers do have virtual trashcans, and the deleted items that oc-
cupy them are arguably abandoned. So, if the government conducts a
search of a Windows Recycle Bin or a restoration and search of deleted
files, is the Fourth Amendment implicated? According to the First Cir-
cuit, it is. In United States v. Upham,'°4 the court found enough of a dis-
tinction between deleted computer files and trash bags left on the street
to state that a computer user continued to have an expectation of privacy
in deleted computer files. 0 5 Unlike garbage left on the street, where,
conceivably, anyone may rifle through it, deleted computer files are not
exposed to the public at-large.' 06
C. Password Protection and Encryption
Files protected by passwords or encryption are entitled to a greater
level of privacy than those without such safeguards.' 0 7 In Trulock v.
Freeh, the Fourth Circuit held that protecting a computer with a pass-
word is an expression of intent to remain private, akin to placing a lock
on a footlocker.' 08 The Tenth Circuit has adopted this analogy.' 09
However, one commentator has suggested that there is no basis for
granting heightened privacy rights to electronic information protected by
encryption."0 Professor Kerr analogizes encryption to the shredding of
files or to speaking in foreign languages, both being scenarios in which
no heightened level of privacy was granted."' Simply because individu-
als express their desire to hide their computer files behind encryption or
their physical files by shredding does not mean that such a privacy ex-
pectation is legitimate enough for the government to be bound to ac-
knowledge it.
IV. ELUSIVE LIMITS FOR COMPUTER SEARCHES
When the Fourth Amendment is implicated, a search must be con-
ducted under the auspices of a warrant or pursuant to one of the excep-
104. 168 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Upham v. United States, 527 U.S.
1011 (1999).
105. Id. at 537 n.3.
106. Id. ("We reject the government's suggestion that, by deleting the images, Upham 'aban-
doned' them and surrendered his right of privacy. Analogy is a hallowed tool of legal reasoning; but
to compare deletion to putting one's trash on the street where it can be searched by every passer-by
is to reason by false analogy." (citations omitted)).
107. See, e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391,403 (4th Cir. 2001).
108. Id.
109. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Because intimate informa-
tion is commonly stored on computers, it seems natural that computers should fall into the same
category as suitcases, footlockers, or other personal items that 'command[] a high degree of pri-
vacy"' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir.
1992))).
110. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a "Reason-
able Expectation of Privacy?," 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 505 (2001).
Ill. Id. at 513-18 (citing United States v. Longoria 177 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999)
(foreign languages); United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 928 (1st Cir. 1992) (shredding)).
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tions to the warrant requirement. When the government conducts a
search of computer files in the context of a validly issued search warrant,
the scope of the search must be limited to those things particularly de-
scribed by the warrant. However, as Burgess recognizes, narrowing the
scope of a lawful search of a computer becomes difficult, if not impossi-
ble. This section examines the problem of scope and generality in com-
puter searches.
A. The Plain View Doctrine
Under the plain-view doctrine, if an officer conducting a lawful
search uncovers an item that is obviously contraband or evidence, the
officer may seize that item. 12 However, as the Burgess court empha-
sized, the owner of a computer may have masked the location or nature
of contraband through creative use of file names, extensions, and direc-
tory structure. Accordingly, a search of a computer ultimately must be
conducted in a manner which renders the entire contents of a hard drive
in "plain view."' 1 3 As Professor Kerr has stated, the plain view exception
"does not impose a real limit on searches for electronic evidence ....
Because electronic evidence can be located anywhere on a hard drive, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to say that a physical search was objec-
tively unjustifiable."' 
14
B. File names and Extensions
One limitation on searches for digital evidence could be file names.
Often file or folder names speak to their contents. For example, the Sixth
Circuit found that an informant's tip that a defendant had a folder on his
computer titled "child kiddie" provided, in part, the basis for probable
cause for a warrant to search that computer. 15 However, Burgess rejects
the converse proposition: that a search can be restricted to files with sus-
picious names."1 6 The Tenth Circuit argues that file names can easily be
changed to disguise their contents.
17
Another limitation could be file extensions. File extensions are
"tags" appended to file names that indicate to the computer and the user
what type the file is. Presumably, a search could be restricted to files that
exhibit specific file extensions. For instance, a search for child pornogra-
phy could be limited to image files with extension types such as .gif,
.jpeg, and so on.
112. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,464-66 (1971).
113. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1095 (1 0th Cir. 2009).
114. Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
279, 305 (2005).
115. United States v. McNally, 327 F. App'x 554, 557-58 (6th Cir. 2009).
116. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1092-94.
117. Id. at 1093.
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The Burgess court rejected this limitation as well. 1 8 Like file
names, it reasoned, file extensions can be manipulated to conceal a file's
true nature, and a wide variety of file extensions can hold the type of
information sought by authorities." 9 This argument was also advanced
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in
United States v. Gray.2 ° There, the court asserted, as did the Burgess
court, that file names and extensions cannot limit the scope of a proper
search of a computer.121
C. Restrictions of Search Methodology
Professor Kerr has suggested that one means of limiting the scope
of computer searches is to require police to have their search methodol-
ogy pre-approved by a magistrate.' 22 However, Burgess explains that any
search protocol for a computer will ultimately degrade into a general
search.1 23 At first blush, keyword searches may seem like an acceptable
method of restraining a computer search. But, as the Burgess court ex-
pressed, such searches are often based on file names, 124 and if file names
may be modified to conceal legitimate objectives of a search, keyword
searches are just as unreliable. 25 Similarly, requiring officers to search a
computer based on the manner in which the files are organized does
nothing to eliminate the possibility that pertinent evidence could be con-
cealed in an unintuitive location on the drive; as a result, authorities can
present a colorable argument of the necessity to search everywhere on
the drive. 16 Indeed, Professor Kerr asserts, "The physical-world rules do
not prevent a general rummaging through electronic evidence.
'1 27
But even the Burgess court fell into the trap of trusting prescribed
methodologies to limit computer searches. The court stated:
A warrant may permit only the search of particularly described
places and only particularly described things may be seized. As the
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999).
121. Id.
122. See Kerr, supra note 114, at 316 (citing In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp.
2d 953 (N.D. Ill. 2004)).
123. See Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1094.
124. While forensic search engines such as dtSearch look for keywords inside of text-based
documents giving some clue as to their genuine contents, this is not the case in digital photographs
where no or limited text is associated with the file's contents. See Beryl A. Howell, Digital Foren-
sics: Sleuthing on Hard Drives and Networks, VT. B.J., Fall 2005, at 39, 42-43.
125. See Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1093-94. See generally Susan W. Brenner & Barbara A. Frede-
riksen, Computer Searches and Seizures: Some Unresolved Issues, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 39, 60-61 (2002) (examining the limitations of automated searches on computers).
126. The Burgess court mocks this notion, stating: "One would not ordinarily expect a warrant
to search filing cabinets for evidence of drug activity to prospectively restrict the search to 'file
cabinets in the basement' or to file folders labeled 'Meth Lab' or 'Customers.' And there is no
reason to so limit computer searches." Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1094.
127. Kerr, supra note 114, at 305.
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description of such places and things becomes more general, the me-
thod by which the search is executed become[s] more important-the
search method must be tailored to meet allowed ends.
128
However, the court's suggestion of a limiting principle is simply to
look in obvious places first and less obvious places second, which is tru-
ly no limit at all. 129 Instead, such methodology is a means of expedit-
ing-rather than limiting-searches. As the court conceded, "a structured
approach may provide only the illusion of protecting privacy inter-
ests."
, 130
D. Generality and Heterogeneity
The holdings of Burgess and Gray create a scenario where the per-
missible search of a computer for any one file automatically permits law
enforcement to search all files on the computer, effectively turning a
particularized warrant-where one exists-into a general warrant when-
ever a computer file is specified.' 31 This problem exists, in part, because
computers contain many heterogeneous files, most of which will not be
responsive to any given search.
This problem of heterogeneous records is not new to computers.
The Supreme Court has considered it in the context of searches of file
cabinets. In Andresen v. Maryland, the Supreme Court stated:
We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a
warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person's papers that are
not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for physical
objects whose relevance is more easily ascertainable. In searches for
papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be exam-
ined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact,
among those papers authorized to be seized. Similar dangers, of
course, are present in executing a warrant for the "seizure" of tele-
phone conversations. In both kinds of searches, responsible officials,
including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are
conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon
privacy.' 
32
Like papers and phone records, searches of computer records inevi-
tably cause non-responsive documents to be swept up with responsive
128. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1094.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1095 (emphasis added).
131. This generality problem is exacerbated by the Upham decision. See supra Part I1I.B. The
Upham court held that a warrant authorizing a search of defendant's computer implicitly authorized
federal agents to restore and search deleted files on the computer. United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d
532, 537 n.3 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Upham v. United States, 527 U.S. 1011 (1999).
Any method of "extract[ing]" the information sought, said the court, was permissible. Id. at 536.
Putting Burgess and Upham together, a search of any computer for a single file authorizes a search
of every file including those deleted files, which may be-by any means-recovered.
132. 427 U.S. 463,482 n.l I (1976).
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files. The Court permits files to be examined so investigators may deter-
mine whether those files are authorized for seizure-indeed, this is what
occurred in Burgess.'33 However, the Court's admonition that this search
be "conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon
privacy"' 34 must not be ignored. Searching a computer by peering into
the contents of every folder and every file is perhaps the method that
least minimizes "unwarranted intrusions upon privacy." In fact, the
Court's language in Andresen may preclude investigators from conduct-
ing the type of search performed in Burgess and Gray so long as there
are less intrusive methods available. Furthermore, purporting to limit a
general search by requiring it to start at the most obvious location but
ultimately allowing it to wander through the entire contents of a hard
drive cannot be seen as meeting Andresen's minimization requirement
because the privacy violation, in the end, is identical to that of a general
search of the hard drive. The sanctioning of this approach exemplifies the
type of illusory protection employed by the Burgess court.
Aside from asking the investigators to begin their search in the most
obvious location, the Tenth Circuit provided a second-and equally illu-
sory-protection. When Agent Hughes found the first image of child
sexual exploitation on David Burgess's hard drive he stopped searching
and obtained an expanded warrant that included permission to search for
additional child pornography. 35 Hughes' original search was constrained
by the scope of the first warrant; which was designed to adhere to the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Carey. In Carey, the court held that in order
to utilize the plain view doctrine in searches of electronic records, an
officer must obtain an additional warrant upon discovering contraband
not particularly described in the original warrant. 136 The Carey court
found that an officer conducting a warranted computer search for drug
evidence violated the Fourth Amendment when he exceeded the scope of
the warrant by extending his search to look for additional child pornog-
raphy after identifying an initial image. 37 In contrast, the Burgess court
commended Agent Hughes for securing additional authority to search for
child pornography, but admitted that Hughes could have gone on search-
ing as long as he was still searching for photos of drugs or anything else
within the scope of the original warrant. 3 8 In other words, Hughes could
have searched so long as his subjective intention was to find pictures of




135. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1084.
136. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999).
137. Id. at 1271, 1276.
138. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1095.
139. See id. Looking at the subjective intent of an officer conducting a search is an oddity in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)
(holding that an officer's subjective reasons for a vehicle stop are irrelevant).
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While the Burgess court's response to the Carey rule is tepid,' 40
from a privacy standpoint there is even less reason to celebrate such a
rule. To begin with, if officers can search until they find contraband out-
side the scope of their warrant, but can use that contraband to retroac-
tively secure an expanded warrant and continue searching for similar
contraband, it is unclear what additional limit that places on an electronic
search. Second, Burgess stands for the proposition that an officer search-
ing a computer for tax records who finds photos of drugs has merely to
state that they are still searching for tax records as they systematically
(and inadvertently, of course) stumble across every photo of drugs on the
hard drive.' 4' Last, an officer who complies with the Carey rule and stops
searching after finding the first instance of contraband not covered by the
warrant will inevitably discover all contraband on the computer after
securing an additional warrant. Thus, even if officers fail to stop and
secure a warrant, modem rules of criminal procedure would prevent any
evidence so obtained from being excluded from evidence in a later tri-
al.' 42 Accordingly, the requirement to stop an ongoing search upon dis-
covering unexpected contraband to secure an expanded warrant is a
wholly illusory protection, ultimately granting no greater limitation on
the scope of a computer search than having no requirements at all.
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROVIDES A SOLUTION: THIRD PARTY REVIEW
On one hand, courts reject general warrants and general searches.
143
However, cases like Gray and Burgess stand for the proposition that-by
necessity-a search of a computer for any one thing can easily degener-
ate into a general search of the computer's contents. Andresen states that
this is permissible so long as no alternative exists that would generate
fewer privacy invasions. But is there truly no alternative to allowing offi-
cers free reign whenever they have cause to search a computer?
In United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 144 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals created such an alternative. Comprehensive
Drug Testing outlined a new rule requiring third-party review and redac-
tion of computer files, which restricts, while not crippling, law enforce-
ment's access to personal computer files.
45
140. See Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1092 ("[lit is tempting ... to over read Carey. But the Carey
holding was limited.").
141. See id. This subjective standard creates a perverse incentive for officers to lie about what
their intentions are while searching a computer.
142. According to the so-called inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, this
type of evidence could be introduced to trial. See generally Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)
(holding that exclusion of evidence initially obtained illegally, but which would have been inevitably
discovered, is contrary to purpose of exclusionary rule).
143. See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
144. 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
145. Id. at 1006.
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A. Background
Guided by suspicions that Bay Area Lab Cooperative ("BALCO")
had supplied controlled steroids to professional baseball players, the fed-
eral government launched an investigation into the lab in 2002.146 That
same year, Major League Baseball ("MLB") entered into an agreement
with the Major League Baseball Player's Association to conduct random,
suspicionless drug testing of players. 147 According to the agreement,
urine samples were collected and tested for banned substances, and the
results would remain anonymous and confidential.148 MLB employed
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. ("CDT") to independently administer
the testing program. 1
49
Federal investigators learned of ten players that had tested positive
in the CDT program. 15 The government obtained a subpoena for all drug
testing records and specimens pertaining to MLB in CDT's possession.'
51
In response, CDT and the players moved to quash the subpoena. 52 Sub-
sequently, federal authorities obtained a warrant authorizing the search of
CDT's facilities for evidence relating to the ten players suspected by
federal investigators of steroid use.153 However, the government, con-
ducting the search, promptly seized and searched all of the drug testing
records, including the test results of hundreds of MLB players and of "a
great many other people."'
5 4
In response, CDT and the players moved for return of the drug test-
155 156ing records. 55 The players prevailed at the District Court level. Athree-judge panel in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part
146. Id. at 993.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. CDT, in turn, hired Quest Diagnostics, Inc. ("Quest") to conduct blind testing wherein
CDT retained the names of the players and the sample results, while Quest did the actual testing,






155. Id. The players invoked Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) which provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation
of property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed in the district
where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any factual issue nec-
essary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court must return the property to
the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and
its use in later proceedings.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (g).
156. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 993-94. Judge Cooper in the Central District of
California granted the motion, stating that federal authorities had failed to comply with the terms of
the original warrant, and ordered the return of the records (the "Cooper Order"). Id. CDT and the
players also obtained a similar order from Judge Mahan in the District of Nevada relating to the
records and samples seized under warrants issued by that court (the "Mahan Order"). Id. at 994.
CDT and the players moved to quash the subpoenas, and Judge llston in the Northern District of
California quashed the subpoenas (the "Illston Quashal"). Id.
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and reversed in part. 157 The Ninth Circuit then voted to hear the case en
banc.1
58
B. The Ninth Circuit Faces the Scope of a Computer Search Problem
Similar to the Burgess court, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with
the problem of a search for a single document or group of documents on
a computer degenerating into a general search of the computer's hard
drive. The Ninth Circuit had dealt with heterogeneous searches before in
United States v. Tamura.159 In that case, the court permitted the govern-
ment to seize a number of boxes of paper files in order to sort through
and segregate the pertinent evidence. 16° Tamura can be analogized with
Carey: in both cases, procedural requirements were imposed on a search
of heterogeneous records and in both cases the government ultimately
obtained total access to all documents.' 6' However, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that Tamura was never intended to be applied to digital evi-
dence cases.' 62 The court emphasized that digital evidence cases, unlike
Tamura, do not merely "involve[] a few dozen boxes," but rather "mil-
lions of pages of information. ' 63 Further, Tamura was anticipated to be
the rare exception, yet with the increasing prevalence and importance of
digital evidence, heterogeneous searches can hardly be considered rare
exceptions. 64 With the understanding that the Tamura exception would
fast swallow the rule, the court updated its heterogeneous searches juris-
prudence, recognizing "the daunting realities of electronic searches."'
' 65
In considering this change, the court attempted to balance two inter-
ests. On one hand the court recognized that because computer records are
heterogeneous, government searches of computers will inevitably sweep
up large amounts of nonresponsive personal information. 166 As the court
stated, "over-seizing is an inherent part of the electronic search proc-
ess."' 167 Furthermore, as the Burgess court identified, legitimate objec-
tives of searches may be concealed based on file names, directory struc-
ture, or file extension, requiring a diligent officer to expand her search to
the entirety of the digital storage device.
68
157. Id. The panel upheld the Cooper Order on the grounds the appeal was untimely. Id.
158. Id.
159. 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
160. Id. at 595.
161. See Donald Resseguie, Note, Computer Searches and Seizure, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 185,
209-10 (2000) (critiquing Tamura's failure to restrict the scope of a computer search).
162. See Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 996 ("Tamura, decided in 1982, just pre-
ceded the dawn of the information age ... .
163. Id. at 1004.
164. Id. at 1006.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1004, 1006.
167. Id. at 1006.
168. See id. at 1004.
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On the other hand, computers contain vast amounts of personal in-
formation about their owners, and-in many cases, such as email serv-
ers-of many other people.' 69 Modem Americans, said the Ninth Circuit,
have no choice but to have personal information on the computers of
others.170 Subjecting these servers to the type of limitless computer
search endorsed by Burgess could result in the violation of the privacy of
millions of other potentially innocent people.'
7'
Balancing these two interests, the court created five requirements to
restrict the scope of computer searches' 72 : (1) the government should
waive the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases; (2) seized files
must be segregated and redacted by specialized or independent personnel
in such a way that the government does not have free access to the mate-
rials; (3) warrants and subpoenas must include the government's history
of seeking that information as well as the actual risk that the information
will be destroyed; (4) the government must tailor its search in order to
uncover only that information for which it has probable cause; and (5)
the government may not keep non-responsive data, and must keep the
magistrate informed as to what it does and does not keep. 1
73
Comprehensive Drug Testing's second requirement requires the
government to hire a third party or specialized computer personnel to
review and redact nonresponsive information from the search. 174 In either
case, the personnel may not divulge any nonresponsive information to
law enforcement. 75 This requirement provides real-not illusory-
privacy protections. The third party will have the ability to perform the
general search that the Burgess court finds inescapable, but the informa-
tion exhumed by such a search can only be used by law enforcement if it
meets the particulars of a warrant. Arguably, this standard is onerous,
depriving law enforcement of important evidence that may not be other-
wise obtainable. Indeed, two circuits have recently made that argument.
C.Comprehensive Drug Testing's Impact on Subsequent Cases
1. The Seventh Circuit: United States v. Mann
76
After Comprehensive Drug Testing, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals grappled with digital evidence in United States v. Mann. In
Mann, police discovered child pornography while searching Mann's
computer pursuant to a warrant for digital evidence of voyeurism, and
proceeded to search the entire computer without a grant of additional
169. Id. at 1004-05.
170. Id. at 1005.
171. See id.




176. 592 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010).
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authority. 77 The court distinguished Carey by noting that the searching
officer in Mann, despite finding child pornography, never stopped look-
ing for evidence of voyeurism. 178 In effect, the Seventh Circuit thus ap-
plies Carey only in cases where the officer subjectively intended to ex-
ceed the scope of the warrant. This rule fails to provide substantive com-
puter privacy protections for three reasons. First, the rule opens up com-
puter searches to ex-postfacto justifications by officers. Second, the Su-
preme Court has long held that subjective motivations by officers are
irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis.' 79 Finally, even if the officer is
required to comply with Carey by securing additional search authoriza-
tion, this rule, as discussed supra, does little to limit the scope of a com-
puter search. 80
The Mann court also rejected the Comprehensive Drug Testing rule,
reaffirming the plain view doctrine's role in digital evidence cases. 
81
However, the court signaled its displeasure at the state of digital evidence
jurisprudence, disagreeing with the substance of the Comprehensive
Drug Testing rule but not its purpose.182 To the Mann court, the Compre-
hensive Drug Testing rule was "efficient but overbroad" and instead sug-
gested that less severe rules would develop incrementally "through the
normal course of fact-based case adjudication."' 83 However, the Burgess
court, by failing to build on the electronic search limitations established
in Carey and Walser, demonstrates the problems an incremental ap-
proach presents. As Professor Kerr has argued, physical-world rules of
criminal procedure cannot simply be built up-incrementally or other-
wise-to create meaningful protections of digital privacy.184
2. The Fourth Circuit: United States v. Williams'
85
In Williams, the Fourth Circuit took a different approach. Digital
searches, the court held, are not distinguishable from other searches.
186
Accordingly, the court rejected even the illusory protections of Carey.'87
Under the Williams rule, a search of digital evidence pursuant to a valid
warrant is no different than any other search. 88 To the Fourth Circuit,
digital evidence presents no different a situation than the mixed records
177. Id. at 781.
178. Id. at 784.
179. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816-17 (1996).
180. See supra Part I.B.2.
181. Mann, 592 F.3d at 785-86.
182. See id.
183. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Callahan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
184. See Kerr, supra note 114, at 280.
185. 592 F.3d 511 (4th Cir. 2010).
186. Id. at 523-24.
187. Id. at 523.
188. See id. at 524.
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problems that cases like Tamura were tailored to address.'89 While this
understanding avoids propping up illusory protections, it does so by pro-
viding little-if any-in the way of computer privacy protections.
The approaches of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits fail to resolve
the problem that frustrated the Burgess court. On one hand, the Fourth
Circuit appears satisfied that no additional safeguards are necessary to
protect computer privacy, a position that at least does not create the illu-
sion of computer privacy where none exists. On the other hand, the Tenth
and Seventh Circuits both agree that digital evidence requires additional
privacy protections, yet those courts either cannot find a way to imple-
ment meaningful protections or decline to do so. If courts claim to be-
lieve that privacy protections are needed for digital evidence cases, those
courts should reject illusory and incremental approaches and adopt sub-
stantive protections; to date, only the Ninth Circuit has done so.
Like the Tenth Circuit's rules in Carey, Burgess, and Walser, the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Tamura imposed only illusory privacy protec-
tions, ultimately permitting a general search of a heterogeneous record.190
The Ninth Circuit recognized in Comprehensive that an outdated ap-
proach that assumes heterogeneous records are the exception, and not the
norm, cannot be justified in a modern context. 191 The Supreme Court's
dictum in Andresen, which directs officers to "minimize[] unwarranted
intrusions upon privacy" when searching files may mean that the rules
stated by the Ninth Circuit--or some lesser version thereof-are consti-
tutionally mandated.192 The Ninth Circuit's Comprehensive Drug Testing
decision requires the government to waive the plain view doctrine.
193
While the Seventh Circuit criticizes this approach as "efficient, but over-
broad," 94 the Ninth Circuit's rule at least provides meaningful protec-
tions to computer privacy. If the Tenth Circuit cannot justify any mean-
ingful protections, then it should-as the Fourth Circuit has-openly
admit this. On the other hand, if digital privacy is important to the Tenth
Circuit, the court should look to the Ninth Circuit for an example of how
to create meaningful protections.
CONCLUSION
As long as courts such as the Tenth Circuit decline to confront the
unique Fourth Amendment implications of computers and electronic
evidence, lower courts are likely to suffer the same pitfalls as the Bur-
189. See id.
190. See United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Resseguie,
supra note 161, at 209-10.
191. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1004-05 (9th Cir.
2009) (en bane).
192. Andresen v Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n. I I(1976).
193. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d at 1006.
194. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2010).
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gess court. This result will have troubling consequences for our increas-
ingly electronic society. Treating a computer as a container will ulti-
mately result in more warrantless searches of computers. This considera-
tion is exacerbated by the difficulty of providing meaningful limits to
legitimate searches of digital evidence as discussed in Burgess. Indeed, if
police are allowed to access computers in the same manner as any other
container, and their access to electronic files cannot be meaningfully
limited, an individual's most personal digital files will be increasingly
exposed to law enforcement. Accordingly, an individual's personal com-
puter files are now subject to a low threshold for discovery by lawful
search or accident. Rather than admit that an individual can expect their
private files to often get swept up with legitimate digital search objec-
tives, however, the Tenth Circuit indefensibly relies on the illusion of
privacy protection in computers.
The Ninth Circuit advanced a substantive protection of computer
privacy in Comprehensive Drug Testing. Third party review and redac-
tion allows police to access information for which they have probable
cause, without giving law enforcement carte blanche to examine nonre-
sponsive or irrelevant private computer files. The expanding role of com-
puters in modern life, the Andresen dictum requiring the minimization of
privacy infringements, and the example of the Ninth Circuit should push
other courts, including the Tenth Circuit, to update their decade-old het-
erogeneous search rules to address these realities-or, at the very least,
assert their rejection of computer privacy in plain terms.
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